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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INSTITUTE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS MET IN THE TRIAL OF
CASES BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
By RALPH M. HOYT*
WHAT ARE ADMISSIBLE MATERIALS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

DECISIONS IN QUASI JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?
N dealing with the work of administrative tribunals, much difference of opinion exists as to the extent to which those

tribunals are or ought to be exempt from the established procedures that apply to litigation in the courts. On the one hand
we find an entirely natural tendency of the administrators themselves to regard their work as of an expert character in which
the training and experience of the administrators and their staffs
should be permitted to furnish many a shortcut in the ascertainment of facts. On the other hand we have the time-honored
tradition of permitting every litigant to confront the witnesses
who oppose him, to cross-examine them, and to know exactly
what evidence is used by the tribunal in the decision of his case.
tThe MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW is privileged to present in this issue a
portion of the proceedings of the Institute on Administrative Law and
Procedure conducted at Philadelphia in September, 1940, under the auspices
of the Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar of the
American Bar Association. Because of space limitations, it has been possible to include only a portion of the entire proceedings. Some of the
subdivisions of the program were presented in the form of documented
papers. Other parts were presented somewhat more informally. The
selection has necessarily been made from among the written papers, although the choice has not been an easy one to make, in view of the
interesting and timely quality of the entire program.-EDITOR.
*Member of the firm of Shea & Hoyt, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Chairman
of the Committee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals in the Section
of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association.
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Among the subjects as to which this conflict of ideas is most
pronounced are three which are to be discussed in the present
paper, namely, (1) the admissibility of hearsay testimony, (2)
the extent to which the administrative tribunal may take "judicial" notice of facts, and (3) the extent to which such a tribunal
may make ex parte resort to staff consultations and reports.
After discussing these subjects in the light of the judicial precedents bearing upon them, we shall briefly consider what remedy,
if any, the parties to an administrative proceeding have if the
established limitations are not observed.
I. Is HEARSAY ADMISSIBLE?
This question really resolves itself into two: First, may hearsay be admitted at all without the commission of reversible
error? And second, if it may be so admitted can it constitute the
sole support of a finding by the administrative tribunal?
For the federal judicial system, the Supreme Court of the
United States has answered both of these questions in the Consolidated Edison Company Case' by holding that a finding which
is unsupported by substantial evidence cannot stand; that "mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence;" but that the "mere admission of matter which would
be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order."
This rule was laid down in December, 1938. just a few
months previously the circuit court of appeals for the second
circuit, speaking by Judge Learned Hand, had stated in the
Remington-Rand Case2 that while mere rumor would not support
a finding, "hearsay may do so, at least if more is not conveniently
available and if in the end the finding is supported by the kind
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely
in serious affairs." The latter portion of the statement is probably
about the equivalent of the Supreme Court's subsequent statement
in the Consolidated Edison case that evidence, to be substantial,
must be "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."
Another case which preceded the Consolidated Edison Case by
only a few months was the decision of the court of appeals for the
District of Columbia in the Tri-State BroadcastingComnpany Case,'
'Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (1938)
S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126.
305 U.
2
National Labor Relations Board v. Remington-Rand, Inc., (C.CA. 2nd
Cir. 1938) 94 Fed. (2d) 862.
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involving an order of the Federal Communications Commission.
The court reversed the commission's order because of the insufficiency of its findings. In addition, the court held that the
admission of certain hearsay evidence was improper, but declined
to pass on the question whether that error alone would have
warranted reversal. The case involved the issuance of a license to
a broadcasting station in competition with one already existing.
The hearsay evidence consisted of the testimony of the applicant as
to his talks with a large number of people who told him that another station would be very beneficial and that they would support
it financially. The court held that while the commission was not
limited to the strict rules of evidence, the admission of the hearsay
testimony in question was in violation of fundamental principles
because it deprived the opposing party of the right to cross-examine
those whose composite views the applicant was "reflecting into the
record."
The case just referred to suggests a serious question, however,
as to how it is possible, without some relaxation of the hearsay
rule, to make proof before an administrative" body of such abstract things as public desires, convenience and necessity. Questions relating to the establishment or abandonment of railroad
or street railway lines, the stopping of trains at certain stations,
the licensing of bus lines or broadcasting-stations, and the like, are
constantly coming before regulatory commissions, and the answer
depends to some extent upon the feeling and reaction of the
"general public." Obviously the general public cannot be put on the
witness stand; yet-it is desirable that information as to views held
by people generally should get into the record in some manner.
In these days of Gallup polls and inquiring reporters it might not be
an undue straining of the hearsay rule to permit such testimony
as was offered in the Tri-State BroadcastingCompany Case, at
least if it came from a disinterested source, such as a public official
or a poll-taking agency. Perhaps the court's treatment of this
testimony would not have been so severe if it had not come from
the applicant itself. It is to be remembered also that in cases
of the type now referred to, the administrative tribunal is usually
exercising a power that is purely legislative-passing upon the
granting or withholding of a franchise-and that where these matters are handled by the legislature itself, without the intervention
3Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,

(1938) 68 App. D. C. 292, 96 Fed. (2d) 564.
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of a commission, there is no limit to the remoteness of the "testimony" that is permitted before the legislative committees.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, even
in a situation involving such a strictly legal relationship as that
between a carrier and shippers seeking the refunding of overcharges, that some relaxation of the hearsay rule may at times be
a physical necessity. In Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,4
decided twenty years ago, the court had before it an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission awarding reparations in excess of $150,000 on many thousands of carloads of cattle which
had been shipped by a large number of shippers. The details of the
shipments were placed in evidence by the assistant secretary of the
cattle raisers' association, who had gathered the data, investigated
the claims, visited some of the points of destination, and examined
the records of the shippers. The circuit court of appeals held
that his testimony was all hearsay and insufficient to support the
commission's, reparation order. The Supreme Court reversed,
stating as its primary ground that the testimony had not been
specifically objected to as hearsay when offered, but pointing out,
in addition, that the Interstate Commerce Commission is not bound
by the strict rules of evidence; that the claims had been filed with
the carrier in itemized form and subject to their thorough investigation; and that the long experience of the assistant secretary of
the association and the investigations carried on by him were such
as to make him an expert, of whose qualifications the commission
itself was the primary and virtually the sole judge. What the
court was really laboring to accomplish in the Spiller Case, it
would seem, was to hold, without actually saying it, that strict
enforcement of the hearsay rule in situations of this kind is
simply impossible.
In the state courts, the sufficiency of hearsay testimony to sustain an administrative finding has been both squarely denied and
squarely upheld. The question has arisen most frequently in
workmen's compensation cases, where it sometimes happens that
the only testimony available to establish the occurrence of an industrial accident is hearsay testimony. The courts of Arizona, California, Ohio and Virginia have held that a finding of liability may
rest wholly upon such testimony;' the courts of a long list of
other states have held the contrary.' In the states which permit
such evidence as the sole support of the finding there is usually a
4(1920) 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sup. Ct. 466, 64 L. Ed. 810.
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statutory provision exempting the commission from observing the
"technical rules of evidence," and that statute is availed of by the
courts as the basis for upholding the finding; but on the contrary,
there are other states where, with a similar statute in force, the
court has taken the position that the hearsay rule is not one of
the technical rules of evidence which the commission may disregard, but "is founded upon the experience, common knowledge
and conduct of mankind."7 Probably the leading case on the point
is Carrollv. Knickerbocker Ice Co.,) where the New York court
of appeals in 1916 held that a provision of the workmen's compensation act exempting the board from observing common-law
or statutory rules of evidence related only to the initial acceptance
of the evidence by the board, not to its probative force; and that
"inthe end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made." Similarly, the United
States Supreme Court in the Consolidated Edison Case9 made its
ruling against sole reliance on hearsay evidence in the face of a
declaration in the national labor relations act that "the rules of'
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." 10
The courts which hold that hearsay may constitute the sole
basis of a vital finding of fact usually take the position that the
probative value of such evidence is for the board or commission to
decide, and that its discretion will be upheld if not abused. The
supreme court of Ohio put it this way in the Baker Case, cited
in footnote 5 above:
"There is sound discretion vested in the board by virtue of the
general code to ascertain the truth of a claim by what it considers
5
Ocean A. & G. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, (1928) 34 Ariz. 175,
269 Pac. 77; London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
(1927) 203 Cal. 12, 263 Pac. 196; Baker v. Industrial Commission, (1933)
44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N. E. 10; American Furniture Co. v. Graves, (1925)
141 Va. 1, 126 S. E. 213.
"Olson-Hall v. Industrial Commission, (1922) 69 Colo. 518. 205 Pac.
527; Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Haufe, (1924) 81 Ind. App. 660, 144 N.
E. 844; Swim v. Central Iowa Fuel Co., (1927) 204 Iowa 546, 215 N. W.
603; Reeves v. Union Sulphur Co., (La. 1940) 193 So. 399; Reck v.
Whittlesberger, (1914) 181 Mich. 463, 148 N. W. 247; Helminsky v. Ford
Motor Co., (1933) 111 N. J.L. 369, 168 At. 420; Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., (1916) 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507; Plyler v. Charlotte Country
Club, (1938) 214 N. C. 453, 199 S.E. 622; Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institution v. Industrial Commission, (1927) 70 Utah 549, 262 Pac. 99;
Lloyd-McAlpine Logging Co. v. Industrial Commission, (1926) 188 Wis. 642,
206 N. W. 914.
7Swim v. Central Iowa Fuel Co., (1927) 204 Iowa 546, 215 N. W. 603.
P(1916) 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507.
0305 U. S.197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126.
1029 U. S. C. A. 160, par. (d), 29 F. C. A. sec. 160, par. (d).
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reliable evidence, whether it be hearsay or otherwise. This discretion cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner, for it then
ceases to be discretion."
Two dissenting judges in the Knickerbocker Ice Company
Case in New York similarly took the position that in view of the
liberal purposes of the*workmen's compensation act and the fact
that it was administered by a commission experienced in weighing
evidence, a finding should be permitted to rest upon hearsay "where
the circumstances are such that the evidence offered is deemed
by the commission to be trustworthy."
There are, however, certain types of cases coming before the
administrative tribunals in which the admission of testimony that
is technically hearsay is a practical necessity in the interest of saving time and effort. Such a case is the very recent one of Solar
Electric Co. v. PennsylvaniaPublic Utilities Commission, 11 an electric rate case decided by the superior court of Pennsylvania in
November, 1939. In that case one necessary element of the complainant's proof in his attempt to show that the local public utility
was paying excessive service charges to an affiliated corporation
was to establish that the two corporations were in fact affiliated. On
that point the commission accepted the testimony of two investigators who had examined the books of various corporations comprising an intricate holding company system. The court upheld
the admission of this testimony as against the contention that it
was mere hearsay, pointing out that the investigators were placed
on the witness stand and were available for cross-examination,
and that the reports and records which they had consulted were all
in the company's possession, so that if the conclusions of the witnesses were in any respect erroneous the company had ample
opportunity to bring the errors to light.
Another type of situation in which some relaxation of the
hearsay rule appears to be unavoidable is in such a complicated
matter as the valuation of a public utility property, or other
engineering study necessarily carried on by a whole corps of
workers under the general direction of an engineer in charge. In
such a case it would be a sheer waste of time to require each
assistant to testify to his own small part of the work. Such a
situation arose in Vermont a few years ago, and the court, in
upholding the admission of the testimony of the supervising
engineer as to the correctness of an'exhibit embodying the work
doue by numerous assistants said :12
"'(1939)
137 Pa. Super. 325, 9 A. (2d) 447, 472.
12 Re New England Power Corp., (1931) 103 Vt. 453, 156 AtI. 390.
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"Without attempting to justify the admission of the exhibit
in question on strictly legal grounds, we call attention to the fact
that the exigencies of modern business have called for a liberalization of the technical rules of evidence in cases like this, and that the
courts have yielded to this demand to an appreciable extent. Our
own cases reflect a marked tendency to a relaxation of the hearsay
rule in such circumstances as are here presented. And the question whether the person actually doing the work and making the
record shall be required to attend and testify has come to be largely
a question of expediency."
Summarizing the present state of the law with respect to the
admissibility of hearsay testimony before the administrative tribunals, it can probably be said with safety that the mere admission
of such testimony is not reversible error, but that the use of such
testimony as the sole basis for a vital finding, though permitted
in a small minority of states, is generally frowned upon by the
state and federal courts except where the fact to be proved is of
so complicated a character that some degree of hearsay testimony is practically a necessity.
II.

To

WIAT EXTENT Is JUDICIAL NOTICE BY ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS PERMISSIBLE?

Administrative tribunals are permitted as a matter of course
to take judicial notice of the same facts of which the courts themselves will take notice; but the question whether they can go
further and take notice of facts which are deemed to be common
knowledge in their own specialized field but not generally known
outside of that field, is productive of considerable controversy.
On the one hand it is argued that since a tribunal of this kind
is a specialist in a particular branch of human knowledge it would
be a great waste of time and effort to require that the facts which
are well established in that field be proved over and over again at
every hearing held. On the other hand, it may be urged that the
parties before such a tribunal are entitled to have the record contain
all of the factual material on which the decision will rest, and not to
be confronted with a decision based on some alleged knowledge
of the commission gained from its previous labors in the field.
There are two kinds of subject matter that are involved in this
question of judicial notice. One consists of the contents of public
records, published statistics, reports on file with the tribunal
itself, and the like. The other relates to the expert knowledge
that the tribunal has gathered through its long experience in
deciding cases in its specialized field.
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As to the first type of material, the federal courts have expressed strong disapproval of the practice of deciding cases upon
alleged judicial knowledge of facts vaguely referred to as being
contained in the commission's report files, or in published statistics,
etc. In United States v. Abilene & S. R. Co.' 3 an order of the
interstate commerce commission was held void because of the
commission's use of data contained in railroad reports on file
with it, no notice having been given the parties as to what particular data the commission intended to use. The court, speaking
by Mr. Justice Brandeis, flatly laid down the rule that the commission in order to make use of such data must introduce into the
record, "by specific reference," such parts of the reports as it
wishes to treat as evidence.
Similarly, in a district court case decided in Ohio in 192814
it was held that a commission's finding that a gas company was
paying an unnecessarily high price for its supply of natural gas
could not stand if supported only by the commission's judicial
notice of reports filed with it by other gas companies of the state.
The latest and most thorough discussion of this subject by the
Supreme Court is in the Ohio Bell Telephone Case."5 There the
state commission, after the evidence was all in, had made certain
reductions in the valuation of the telephone company's property on
the basis of information of which it took judicial notice with respect to price trends. The Supreme Court, speaking unanimously
through Mr. justice Cardozo, said:
"An attempt was made by the commission and again by the
state court to uphold this decision without evidence as an instance
of judicial notice. .

..

To press the doctrine of judicial notice to the

extent attempted in this case and to do that retroactively after
the case had been submitted, would be to turn the doctrine into
a pretext for dispensing with a trial.
"What has bean done by the commission is subject, however, to
an objection even deeper. [Citation]. There has been more than
an expansion of the concept of notoriety beyond reasonable limits.
From the standpoint of due process-the protection of the individual against arbitrary action-a deeper vice is this, that even
now we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which
the commission took judicial notice and on which it rested its
conclusion. Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to
"3(1924) 265 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565, 68 L. Ed. 1016.
14 West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, (N.D. Ohio
1928), 42 Fed. (2d) 899.
"5Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, (1937) 301
U. S. 292, 300-302, 57 Sup. Ct. 724, 81 L. Ed. 1093.
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find them out. When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a trial, the party against
whom they are offered may see the evidence or hear it and parry
its effect. Even if they are copied in the findings without preliminary proof, there is at least an opportunity in connection with
a judicial review of the decision to challenge the deductions made
from them. The opportunity is excluded here. The commission,
withholding from the record the evidential facts that it has gathered
here and there, contents itself in saying that in gathering them it
went to journals and tax lists, as if a judge were to tell us, 'I
looked at the statistics in the Library of Congress, and they teach
me thus and so.' This will never do if hearings and appeals are
to be more than empty forms."
On the other hand, the supreme court of Wisconsin held, more
than twenty-five years ago, that the railroad commission might
base its freight rate decisions upon compilations of cost data made
by it from the annual reports filed by the railroads generally with
the commission, without the necessity of offering the reports
in evidence.""
Coming to the second type of judicial notice, which relates
to the expert knowledge of the administrative tribunal because
of its long dealing with the subject matter, the tendency of the
courts has been in the direction of liberality. Thus the supreme
court of Utah has held' 7 that the public utilities commission of
that state may, in a case involving, discontinuance of a railroad
line, take judicial notice of all such facts as a court would notice,
and may also take notice of
"such facts and practices as are generally known throughout
the whole field of railroad transportation; that is, such facts which
are practically universal among operatives in the field to which the
jurisdiction of the commission extends, although they may not be
known to the world generally; but it cannot take its special knowledge which it may have gained from experience or from other hearings and base any findings or conclusions upon such knowledge."
The foregoing rule, it will be observed, broadens the judicial
notice of the commission to the point of including matters of
common knowledge in the technical field in which it operates, but
without permitting it to make use of additional knowledge acquired through its own experience or through the hearing of other
cases. A recent decision in the state of Washington' s appears to
10 Chicago North Western R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, (1914) 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216, 974.
17Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, (1932)
81 Utah
286, 17 Pac. (2d) 287.
' 8 State v. Department of Public Service, (1939) 198 Wash. 37, 86 Pac.
(2d) 1104.
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carry the broadening process considerably, further, holding that
a commission engaged in regulating transportation by ferryboats
may take into consideration "the results of its own inspection of
the physical conditions involved, results of its previous experience
in similar situations, and the general information concerning the
subject which goes to make up its fund of expert knowledge."
The supreme court of Wisconsin has taken a very advanced
position on this subject,'9 holding that in a workmen's compensation case involving the question whether a hernia is of traumatic
origin or not, the commission may decide contrary to the unanimous testimony of the expert witnesses if it knows their testimony
to be untrue from its own long experience with the subject. In
that connection the court said:
"Nonsense clothed in words of learned length falling from the
lips of an expert witness does not afford a sufficient basis upon
which to support a judgment. . . A farmer sitting on a jury
would not be bound by an opinion evidence relating to farming
which he knew or believed to be untrue. Neither would a pharmacist or mechanic or physician. Why then should the members of
the industrial commission be bound to accept opinions of experts
which are contrary to their own knowledge and experience?"
The conclusion which seems to be justified by a study of the
decisions on this subject of judicial notice is that the courts are inclined to accord to the administrative tribunals the power to take
notice with respect to matteis that may be termed the common
knowledge of the specialized fields in which such tribunals are
acting, and there is a tendency to go further and permit them to
take notice of specific facts or phenomena on the basis of their own
experience in the handling of similar cases. The tendency of the
courts is, however, opposed to permitting these tribunals to ramble
at will through their files of reports and statistics and base their
findings upon such data as they may see fit to cull from those
sources without notice to the parties.
To WHAT EXTENT MAY ADIINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
MAKE Ex PARTE RESORT TO STAFF CONSULTATIONS

III.

AND REPORTS?

The Supreme Court of the United States and the state courts
are virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the practice, on
the part of administrative tribunals, of giving consideration to
evidence not contained in the official record to which all parties
9

1 McCarthy v. Sawyer-Goodman

Co., (1927)

194

Wis. 198, 215 N. W.
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have had access. The Supreme Court of the United States took
a firm position on this subject commencing with the earlier cases
coming to it from the interstate commerce commission. In one
such case decided in 1913, where it was sought to sustain an
order of the commission on the basis of information gathered outside of the hearing, the court said :20
"Manifestly there is no hearing when the party does not know
what evidence is offered or considered and is not given an opportunity to test, explain or refute it. . . All parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered and must
be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to offer
evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a party
maintain its rights or make its defense. In no other way can it
test the sufficiency of the facts to support the finding; for otherwise, even though it appeared that the order was without evidence, the manifest deficiency could always be explained on the
theory that the commission had before it extraneous, unknown,
but presumptively sufficient information to support the finding."
And in the famous case of Crowell v. Benson,2' involving an
order under the longshoremen and harbor workers' compensation
act, the suggestion that the deputy commissioner might act upon
information gathered by himself outside of the hearings was
rejected, and the court, by Chief Justice Hughes, asserted that
"facts conceivably known to the deputy commissioner, but not
put in evidence so as to permit scrutiny and contest, will not
support a compensation order."
The state courts have consistently taken the same position.
Thus the supreme court of Illinois said in a railroad case in 1929 :22
"The commissioners cannot act on their own information.
Their findings must be based on evidence presented in the case,
with an opportunity to all parties to know of the evidence to be
submitted or considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect
documents, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal, and
nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such."
In North Dakota, under a statute which provided for the
holding of a hearing and then further provided that "the commissioners are empowered to resort to any other source of information available," the court of last resort held 23 that this statutory
language merely authorized the commissioners, if they deemed
OInterstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
(1913) 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431.
21(1932) 285 U. S. 22, 48, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 291, 76 L. Ed. 598.
22Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, (1929'
335 Ill.
624, 167 N. E. 831, 837.
2
3State v. Milhollan, (1923) 50 N. D. 184, 195 N. W. 292.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

the record incomplete, to procure such additional evidence as
might be available and to make it a part of the record, but that
the decision in every case "must be based upon evidence submitted to them at the hearing or hearings, and that on appeal the
validity and lawfulness of the orders must be determined24by the
evidence contained in the record certified to the court.
The supreme court of Arizona appears to have gone further
than most of the state courts in the direction of permitting the
administrative tribunal to collect and scrutinize information outside
of the record, although that court pays lip service at least to the
doctrine that such information must not be made the basis of the
decision. The question arose in a workmen's compensation case 25
in which the commission, after the close of the hearing, had its
examiners make an ex parte investigation into the facts of the
case and file confidential reports thereon, which the commission
refused to permit the petitioner to see. The court held that the
validity of the commission's award against the petitioner was not
affected by this practice so long as there was in the official record
competent evidence in support of the award. The court stated
.that the "reports of such special examiners are not themselves evidence but are merely in the nature of confidential information from
which the commission may secure legal and competent evidence."
This would seem to open the way to the commission to poison
its mind by the reading of non-record evidence gathered in an
ex parte investigation, without the slightest opportunity for the
parties to refute the evidence or even know what it is. A contrary result was reached in an earlier Illinois case, 26 where the
commission frankly stated in its decision that it had been unable to
determine from the record testimony which way the preponderance lay, and it had sent out its agent to obtain ex parte affidavits
from additional witnesses. The supreme court reversed the resulting award, stating that the parties had the right "not only
to present such evidence as they may desire, but also to be present
at the taking and hearing of the evidence by the opposing party so
that each may have opportunity for the cross-examination of the
other's witnesses." In both the Illinois and Arizona cases there
24See also F. W. Merrick Inc. v. Cross, (1930) 144 Okla. 40, 289 Pac.
267; Lupinski v. Industrial Commission, (1925) 188 Wis. 409, 206 N. W.
195.
2
5Simpkins v. State Banking Department, (1935) 45 Ariz. 186, 42 Pac.
(2d) 47.
514, 114 N. E.
26Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board, (1916) 275 Ill.
275.
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was some evidence in the official record in support of the board's
decision, but the reviewing courts reached opposite conclusions
as to the vitiating effect of the unofficial information collected by
the investigators of the board.
It may be asked, What good are the expert engineering and
accounting staffs of the public utility commissions and the trained
investigators of the other administrative tribunals, if the tribunal
must close its eyes and ears to the facts gathered by these experts?
The answer is, that the members of these staffs have every right
and opportunity to present the results of their ex parte investigations at the regular hearings, exactly like other witnesses placed
upon the stand. The courts time and again have made it clear
that the investigation of cases by members of a commission's staff
is not under any ban whatever; what is disapproved is the use of
the material gathered by these investigators without submitting it
to the interested parties and offering opportunity for cross-examination and rebuttal. One of the leading decisions on this point
is Lindsey v. Piublic Utility Commissioners.2 7 Objection was made
in that case to the commission availing itself of the services of its
engineers and basing its conclusion in whole or in part upon their
investigations. The court held that the commission had a right
to make these independent investigations but that the parties to
the proceedings were entitled to examine the engineers' report and
to cross-examine its authors.
"The report being in the nature of evidence in the case is, like
any other evidence, subject to analysis and impeachment, and had
an application to examine the report been made and refused, or an
application been made to examine the engineers and refused, this
court would regard such refusal as reversible error."
But the public utility was held to have waived its rights in this
regard by failing to ask for a further hearing after the report
was filed, and by thereafter participating in a rehearing without
paying any attention to the report.28
There is no legal objection, of course, to the type of staff
conference which consists merely in threshing over the evidence
actually in the record, summarizing the testimony of witnesses,
and pointing out where the weight of the evidence lies. Work
27(1924) 111 Ohio St. 6, 144 N. E. 729.
2
-Other cases approving the use of ex parte reports if opportunity for
further hearing and cross-examination is afforded are Saratoga Springs v.
Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., (1908) 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E.
693, 701; Gauthier v. Penobscot Chemical Fiber Co., (1921) 120 Me. 73,
113 Atl. 28; Lucas v. Walters Milling Co., (1935) 116 Pa. Super. 171,
176 Atl. 78.
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of this type is analogous to that performed for a judge by his law
clerk.2 ' What we have been discussing is the placing of additional
evidence before the tribunal by means of conferences or reports
or memoranda which the parties to the proceeding are given no
opportunity to know about or to refute. Judicial sanction for
that type of thing appears to be almost completely lacking in this
country.
IV.

How MAY ADVANTAGE BE TAKEN OF PREJUDICIAL
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THIS SUBSECTION?

Where the prejudicial violation consists of the admission of
hearsay testimony, the fact of such violation appears clearly in
the record and can be assigned as error in whatever type of
judicial review may be provided.
Similarly, if the finding rests on judicial notice of something
that is not judicially noticeable, the violation will automatically
appear from the complete absence of evidence in the record as to
such fact. In either case, however, the aggrieved party can expect
no relief from a reviewing court unless the error is really
prejudicial, which means that the evidence improperly received or
the notice improperly taken must constitute the sole support of an
essential finding of fact. If there is any competent corroborating
evidence in the record, the error in receiving hearsay or in taking
judicial notice will be dismissed as immaterial, however good the
basis may be for suspecting that the tribunal was led to its decision
by the improper evidence rather than by the competent corroborating evidence.
As to the third subject of our discussion, namely, the use of
evidence not actually made a part of the record, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is usually rather illusory. Unless the administrative tribunal is frank enough to confess in its written decision
that it has used evidence not appearing in the record, there is
ordinarily no way for the parties to know how much information
the tribunal obtained from round-table conferences with its
technical staff, or what confidential reports from that staff may
be lodged in the private files of the tribunal. It is generally held
that the members of an administrative body cannot be called to the
witness stand and cross-examined as to their processes in deciding
the case,30 so that the opportunity of the aggrieved party to bring
9
298 U. S. 468, 481, 56 Sup. Ct.
2 See Morgan v. United States, (1936)
1288.
L.
Ed.
906, 80
0
3 Morgan v. United States, (1938) 304 U. S. 1, 18, 58 Sup. Ct. 773,
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a suspected violation to the attention of a reviewing court is really
very meager. In those cases in which the non-record evidence constitutes the sole basis for the finding, redress would be available
anyway because of the complete absence of supporting evidence in
the record, without going on to prove that non-record evidence
was actually used by the tribunal. And where the non-record evidence is not the sole support of the finding-as, for instance, where
a divergence exists between the expert witnesses called by the
parties, and the commission's engineer has thrown the weight of
his own expert opinion to one side or the other in a private report
to the commission-it would seem that there is no method now
known to the law by which the aggrieved party may even discover the violation, much less secure redress in a reviewing court.
For that matter, however, the reluctance of the courts to permit
decisions to be upset by inquiring into the mechanics of the process
of decision is anciently established in the case of judges, jurors
and arbitrators, and the application of the same rule to the administrative tribunals cannot justly be criticized as an innovation.
776, 82 L. Ed. 1129; Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Commission,

(1913) 154 Wis. 121, 142 N. W. 476.

